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KICKSTARTING RECONNECTION: 
AN APPROACH TO LEGAL PROBLEMS 




A new model, or ‘third wave’, of computing is emerging, based on the 
widespread use of processors with data handling and communications 
capabilities embedded in a variety of objects and environments that were not 
previously computerised. Various terms have been used to describe this third 
wave, including ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘pervasive’ computing, ‘ambient intelligence’, 
the ‘Internet of Things’ and ‘eObjects’. With the socio-technical change 
brought about by this third wave comes the possibility of a disconnection 
between the law and the new things, activities, and relationships enabled by this 
new model of computing. This disconnection may lead to legal problems of 
uncertainty, under- or over-inclusiveness of conduct in existing law, 
obsolescence, or the complete absence of laws regulating new behaviour. Early 
and rigorous identification and categorisation of legal problems is crucial for 
emerging technologies, to assist in avoiding two problems:  the first being the 
stifling of beneficial innovation by over-regulation, the second the cementing of 
socially undesirable outcomes when vested interests are left too long 
unchecked.  Although the technologies in the third wave are diverse, common 
attributes can be identified, and from examination of these attributes significant 
innovations are revealed. This paper examines these innovations to assist in 
identifying legal problems arising from the third wave.
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I     INTRODUCTION
[A]s technology changes, legal dilemmas arise. As technological change 
becomes increasingly rapid, the need for a methodological approach to 
these problems becomes increasingly urgent.1
Beginning with Mark Weiser in the early 1990s, commentators have been 
predicting the widespread consumer and commercial adoption of ‘a third 
wave of computing’. This third wave encompasses the development and 
commercial and consumer use of previously unconventional forms of 
distributed information technologies, including smartphones, wearable 
computers and human information and communications technology (ICT) 
implants. This third wave contemplates a socio-technical shift where access 
to networked computing is no longer confined to desktop machines, but 
where sensors and microprocessors with internetworking capabilities are 
embedded in everyday objects and environments not previously 
computerised, such as cars, fridges, people and animals. The technologies 
that make up the third wave are referred to as ‘eObjects’ (enhanced objects) 
in this paper, and this term is more fully described in Section II(A) and the 
Appendix.
With the socio-technical shift brought about by the emergence of eObjects, 
comes the possibility of disconnections between existing law and the new 
things, activities, and relationships that arise out of the development and use 
of these new technologies. In Australia, there is as yet very little judicial, and 
no legislative or governmental analysis of the possibility of disconnections.2
Section II(B) of this paper outlines significant imperatives for legal 
researchers and law reform agencies to uncover and respond to possible 
disconnections quickly and rigorously. It continues on to identify the 
categories of legal problems that might arise because of the new things, 
activities and relationships made possible by eObjects. It also proposes that 
the most fruitful way to begin an analysis of legal problems is through 
identification and examination of the innovations that arise out of the 
attributes of eObjects. Section III identifies some key innovations arising out 
of particular attributes of eObjects identified in Section II(A), and the 
interactions between them. It then explains and categorises useful examples 
of existing and potential legal problems arising out of these key innovations.
The main purpose of this paper is to provide legal researchers and law reform 
agencies a useful analytical approach to take when faced with socio-technical 
change, and to illustrate its use in a particular context, that of socio-technical 
change brought about by eObjects. This approach also assists in identifying 
the diversity of legal problems that may arise in this context, in contrast with 
the majority of the existing literature, which concentrates mainly on the 
                                                                
1 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological 
Change’ (2007) 2 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy 239, 285.
2 However, two Australian industry and consumer bodies have issued reports:  Geof Heydon 
and Frank Zeichner, ‘Enabling the Internet of Things for Australia:  Measure, Analyse, 
Connect, Act’ (Industry Report, Communications Alliance Ltd, October 2015); Alexander 
Vulkanovski, ‘“Home, Tweet Home”: Implications of the Connected Home, Human and 
Habitat on Australian Consumers’, Report for Australian Communications Consumer Action 
Network (ACCAN), February 2016. 
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implications of eObjects for privacy and security.3 It is not possible within 
the scope of this paper to be comprehensive, due to the nature and variety of 
innovations within eObjects and possible effects on the law. However, the 
approach taken to analysing the legal problems can provide a roadmap for 
further research that concentrates on more confined issues and/or legal areas 
in depth. 
II THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SOCIO-TECHNICAL
CHANGE AND LAW
The current state of technology limits, in practice, what actions we can
perform, what objects we can create, and what relationships we can form. 
It is thus common for technological change to impact the law, which limits 
what actions we may perform, what objects we may create and use, and 
what relationships will be recognised.4
A The Nature of eObjects
The technologies making up the ‘third wave’ have been called a number of 
different names, most commonly ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘pervasive’ computing, 
‘ambient intelligence’, and the ‘Internet of Things’. Unfortunately, both 
popular and academic writers have been inconsistent in their use of these 
terms.  Definitions have varied depending on geographical locations, 
individual researchers, and have also changed over time. To deal with these 
limitations, this paper adopts the approach taken by Manwaring and Clarke, 
who recently undertook a historical and critical analysis of the different 
terminologies. They proposed a new term, ‘eObject’, for the central element 
of these new technologies. An eObject (‘enhanced object’) is an:
                                                                
3 See, eg Scott R Peppet, ‘Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent’ (2014) 93(1) Texas Law Review 85; Anne 
Uteck, ‘Reconceptualizing Spatial Privacy for the Internet of Everything’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Ottawa, 2013); Robert M Davison, ‘The Privacy Rights of Cyborgs’ (2012) 27 
Journal of Information Technology 324; Adam D  Thierer, ‘The Internet of Things and
Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing 
Innovation’ (2015) 21(2) Richmond Journal of Law & Technology ; Grace Li, ‘Deciphering
Pervasive Computing: A Study of Jurisdiction, E-Fraud and Privacy in Pervasive Computing 
Environments’ and other chapters in Varuna Godara (ed), Risk Assessment and Management 
in Pervasive Computing: Operational, Legal, Ethical and Financial Perspectives
(Information Science Reference, 2009) 218–45; Kevin King, ‘Personal Jurisdiction, Internet 
Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation 
Technologies’ (2011) 21 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology 61; Nancy J King, 
‘When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped—Finding EU–US Solutions to Protect 
Consumer Privacy and Facilitate Mobile Commerce’ (2008) 15 Michigan 
Telecommunications & Technology Law Review 107; Rolf H Weber, ‘Internet of Things—
New Security and Privacy Challenges’ [23] (2009) 26(1) Computer Law and Security 
Review: The International Journal of Technology and Practice 23; David Wright et al (eds), 
Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence (Springer, 2008).
4 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?’ (2007) 8(2) 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 589.
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object that is not inherently computerised, but into which has been embedded one 
or more computer processors with data-collection, data-handling and data 
communication capabilities. 5
However, the technologies and their effects are complex, so this definition, 
while useful as a starting point, does not give a complete view of the 
technologies that the literature discusses. With this limitation in mind, 
Manwaring and Clarke also derived in addition to the core definition, a list of 
common attributes of eObjects. These common attributes, although they do 
not appear in all eObjects, appear sufficiently frequently to drive significant 
socio-technical change, and are therefore useful to examine when exploring 
legal, business strategy, and public policy problems that might arise. These 
common attributes include technical attributes such as volatility of resources 
and vulnerability to security breaches, as well as functional attributes such as 
increased mobility of devices and people, the change in the geographical 
extent of technology, the use of context-aware and autonomous decision-
making technologies, and the likelihood of decreased visibility of devices due 
to advancements in implicit human computer interaction, just to name a few. 
A full list of these attributes is set out in the Appendix.
B An Approach to Uncovering Legal Problems in the 
Face of Socio-Technical Change
The concept of ‘socio-technical change’ used in this paper acknowledges that 
relevant change does not arise only in circumstances where a new product or 
process is developed or an existing product or process is modified. Socio-
technical change also occurs where new forms of conduct enabled by new or 
modified technologies emerge to form part of social practice. 6 Where 
particular socio-technical changes have significant impacts, questions about 
how law and other regulatory tools should respond will inevitably be asked. 
In particular, should the new actions, products and/or relationships brought 
into being be permitted, prohibited, encouraged, required7 or limited in some 
way? And if so, how?  
Changes to law or other forms of regulation should of course be approached 
cautiously. Failure to prohibit particular activities may lead to socially 
undesirable results,8 such as allowing unlimited surveillance of private 
spaces.  However, ‘premature, over-reaching or excessive lawmaking may … 
be an option worse than doing nothing’, particularly where investment in 
beneficial new technologies may be unnecessarily fettered or driven offshore 
by regulatory interference and compliance costs.9 It is also important to 
                                                                
5 Kayleen Manwaring and Roger Clarke, ‘Surfing the Third Wave of Computing: A 
Framework For Research Into eObjects’ (2015) 31(5) Computer Law & Security Review
586, 599.
6 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘How to Think about Law, Regulation and Technology—Problems 
with “Technology” as a Regulatory Target’ (2013) 5(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 1,
10.
7 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford 
University Press 2008), Chapter 6. 
8 Michael Kirby, ‘The Fundamental Problem of Regulating Technology’ (2009) 5 The Indian 
Journal of Law and Technology 1, 11.
9 Ibid 12.
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remember that just because a technology is new, or significantly changed, 
does not by itself mean that its applications operate outside of the scope of 
existing law.10 A new technology, especially in the ICT industry, rarely 
emerges completed ungoverned by legal principles. For example, a new 
product is still usually subject to existing tortious principles and product 
liability legislation, those selling it subject to consumer protection and 
competition law, and creators able to protect it under existing intellectual 
property legislation.11 There is no need for legislators and judges to overreact 
to technological change. For example, a thief who steals a driverless smart 
car is still clearly in breach of section 154F of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW):
the car’s status as an eObject makes no difference to the fundamentals of the 
criminal offence.
In contrast, however, if the thief has an accident in the car causing injury or 
property damage, this may give rise to considerable uncertainty. Who will be 
liable for that damage: the thief; the owner; the manufacturer; and/or the 
third-party developers of faulty software that allowed the car to be stolen in 
the first place? So in some cases there will be legitimate reasons for law to 
change as technology or the socio-technical landscape changes. One way this 
has been characterised is by Brownsword, as the challenge of ‘regulatory 
connection’ or ‘disconnection’.12 The concept of regulatory disconnection 
encompasses the discrepancies between existing law and other regulation 
created to order a previous socio-technical environment, which then require 
‘reconnection’ with new actions, products and relationships made possible by 
new technologies.13 This issue has also been characterised as a concern that 
law inherently has problems ‘keeping up’ with technological changes, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘pacing problem’.14
This is not to say that an initial disconnection means that law will always be 
disconnected from socio-technical changes. Both legislatures and judges in 
the distant and more recent past have acted to adapt or clarify the law to 
respond to technological change, such as:
in 1846, the NSW legislature created a new tortious suit of ‘wrongful 
death’ in response to the introduction of railways and other 
technologies of the industrial revolution;15
in 2006, an Australian Federal Court judge clarified the common 
law for e-commerce transactions by expressly stating that a ‘click’ 
                                                                
10 Bennett Moses, ‘How to Think about Law, Regulation and Technology—Problems with 
“Technology” as a Regulatory Targe’, above n 6, 9.
11 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Agents of Change: How the Law Copes with Technological Change’
(2011) 20 Griffith Law Review 763, 768.
12 Brownsword, above n 7. The challenges of regulatory connection and disconnection are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
13 Bennett Moses, above n 6, 7.
14 See eg, Gary E Marchant et al (eds), The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies 
and Legal-Ethical Oversight:  The Pacing Problem (Springer, 2011).
15 Fatal Accidents Act (1846) 9 & 10 Vict c 93 (NSW). See Barbara Macdonald, ‘Legislative 
Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort 
Reform in Australia’ (2005) 27(3) Sydney Law Review 443, 447–48.
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on a button on a website constituted ‘a contract in writing signed by 
the parties’;16 and 
in 2008, the Australian federal Parliament amended the definition of 
‘parent’ to include non-biological parents where artificial conception 
technology is used.17
However, the speed of change and the timing of legal and other regulatory 
responses is important in successful reconnection. The need to address 
regulatory disconnection in a timely manner can be drawn out by examination 
of the potential effects of what has been labelled the ‘Collingridge 
dilemma’.18
The Collingridge dilemma recognises that in some cases:
potential benefits of new technology are widely accepted before enough is 
known about future consequences or potential risks to regulate the 
technology from the outset, while by the time enough is known about the 
consequences and possible harms to enable regulating it, vested interests 
in the success of technology are so entrenched that any regulatory effort 
will be expensive, dramatic and resisted.19
However, the possible negative results of the Collingridge dilemma may 
dictate a need to respond to technologies as they emerge, and even before 
they come into existence or into commercial use. Once a technology has been 
fully developed, there is usually a strong incentive to resist any regulatory 
change, due mainly to the expense of changing technological design.
Therefore, in some cases it may make sense to implement new laws before 
the technology is fully developed and/or the risks are fully known.20 The 
speed of change reflected by the number of eObjects currently in commercial 
use and in advanced prototype21 means that the challenges posed by the 
Collingridge dilemma are real and immediate.
                                                                
16 eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Limited (2006) eBay 
International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Limited [2006] FCA 1768, Rares J, 
49. See further Kayleen Manwaring, ‘Enforceability of Clickwrap and Browsewrap Terms 
in Australia: Lessons from the US and the UK’ (2011) 5(1) Studies in Ethics, Law, and 
Technology.
17 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s60H.
18 Bennett Moses, ‘How to Think about Law, Regulation and Technology—Problems with 
“Technology” as a Regulatory Target’, above n 6, 8; Roger Brownsword and Morag 
Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First Century:  Text and Materials
(Cambridge University Press 2012), 132. Collingridge himself described it as the ‘dilemma 
of social control’, David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Pinter 1980), 11.
19 Morag Goodwin, ‘Introduction:  A Dimensions Approach to Technology Regulation’ in 
Morag Goodwin, Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes (eds), Dimensions of Technology 
Regulation (Wolf Legal Publishing, 2010) 1, 2.
20 Bennett Moses, ‘How to Think about Law, Regulation and Technology—Problems with 
“Technology” as a Regulatory Target’, above n 6, 8.
21 In 2011, Cisco predicted 50 billion devices will be connected to the Internet by 2020 (David 
Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing 
Everything, Cisco White Paper, April 2011; more recently Gartner gave a more conservative 
estimate of 25 billion by 2020 (Gartner, ‘Gartner Says 4.9 Billion Connected “Things” Will 
Be in Use in 2015’ (2014) <http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2905717>).
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In order to answer the question posed in the first paragraph in Section II(B),
this paper adopts the approach proposed by Bennett Moses in 2007.22 Bennett 
Moses classifies problems that might arise out of a failure of regulatory 
connection in the context of socio-technical change into four categories: 
1. There may be a need to ‘create special rules designed to ban, restrict, 
encourage, or co-ordinate use of a new technology’;23 [‘new harms or 
benefits’].
2. There may be a need to clarify how existing laws apply to new artefacts, 
activities, and relationships, particularly where there is: ‘[a] uncertainty as 
to how a new activity, entity, or relationship will be classified; [b] 
uncertainty where a new activity, entity, or relationship fits into more than 
one category, so as to become subject to different and conflicting rules; [c]
uncertainty in the context of conflicts of laws; and [d] uncertainty where an 
existing category becomes ambiguous in light of new forms of conduct’24
[‘uncertainty’].
3. The scope of existing legal rules may be inappropriate in the context of new 
technologies; [‘under- or over-inclusiveness’]. 
4. Existing legal rules may become obsolete, where (a) the conduct regulated 
is no longer undertaken, or (b) the underlying facts have changed which 
means the rule is no longer justified, or (c) where the rule has become 
‘prohibitively difficult to enforce’25; [‘obsolescence’].26
Bennett Moses’ approach is helpful particularly because it also recognises 
that some changes in technology will not give rise to regulatory 
disconnection, and even those which do to some extent will not create 
problems in all of the above four categories.27 This approach also actively 
discourages any assumptions that just because a technology is new, it 
automatically generates uncertainty or a need for new rules.28
So how do we discover whether one or more of these types of problems arises 
in the case of particular eObjects? How do we best approach a review of 
existing laws to examine if there is a need for new legal rules to manage new 
risks or to encourage new behaviours, or if there exist legal rules which are 
obsolete, under or over-inclusive, or are uncertain?
Koops, in his 2010 attempt to map the field of technology regulation research, 
placed particular importance on the dimension of ‘innovation’ and the fact 
that non-innovative technologies are more likely to operate within existing 
                                                                
22 Bennett Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological 
Change’, above n 1.
23 Ibid 284.
24 Ibid 269.
25 Ibid 268. The difficulties of enforcement in a world with eObjects is extensively discussed 
in Mireille Hildebrandt’s work on ‘ambient law’. See eg, Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘A Vision of 
Ambient Law’ in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies:  
Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing, 2008); and 
Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal 
Protection in the Profiling Era’ (2010) 73(3) Modern Law Review 428.
26 Bennett Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological 
Change’, above n 1, 285.
27 Ibid 246.
28 Ibid 252.
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regulatory frameworks than ‘radically new technologies’. 29 However, he also 
explains that ‘innovation’ is not confined to technologies that did not exist 
previously, but includes technologies which may have existed for some time, 
but where some form of change in the socio-technical environment has led to 
them becoming far more widely used. He argues that ‘[i]t is far from rare that 
a change in the scale of a technology gives rise to significant regulatory 
questions’. 30 Therefore, innovation can be seen when an ‘old’ technology 
becomes significantly more popular, or is re-purposed to achieve different 
outcomes.
It is useful then to examine the innovations contained within or around 
eObjects to see where problems falling into one or more of Bennett Moses’ 
categories will most likely arise. Although some of the technology comprised 
in eObjects, such as Internet connectivity, may not be ‘radically new’, when 
compared with other innovations such as cloning or nanotechnology, a search 
for innovation should not be narrowly circumscribed to mere technical 
advances. For example, it is part of the very nature of the ‘third wave’ that 
many more ‘things’, or eObjects, will be connected to the Internet (or other 
internetworks) than previously. A change in scale this significant is likely to 
cause social change, which in itself may give rise to legal problems. 
This section has identified the types of legal problems that might arise as a 
result of socio-technical change brought on by the development of eObjects.
The categorisation of legal problems is important because it assists in 
ensuring that any legal problems identified are specific and defined, and 
reduce the likelihood that there is an overreaction to socio-technical change. 
This paper does not attempt to provide solutions to the legal problems 
identified. However the analysis and categorisation approach outlined by 
Bennett Moses can also be a useful analytic tool in research focussing on 
solutions. Precise categorisation helps to ensure that legal responses focus on 
a specific defined harm to protect against, or a benefit to encourage. But its 
use also allows successful solutions applied in particular areas to be 
considered for application across other areas.  Where the essential nature of 
the problems are ‘the same’, such as under-inclusiveness or uncertainty, then 
solutions for one specific problem may well be the basis for solutions to other 
problems.
The next section illustrates how this categorisation of legal problems, in 
combination with an examination of the attributes of the technology under 
examination, can assist in a legal analysis of the socio-technical change 
brought about by the introduction of and growth in scale of the use of 
eObjects. It will do so by discussing some of the critical innovations 
contained in eObjects.  Those innovations will be examined in order to 
develop a number of sample analyses of new things, activities and 
relationships arising out of eObjects, and the possibility that legal problems 
may arise out of these aspects of socio-technical change. One or more 
                                                                
29 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Ten Dimensions Of Technology Regulation. Finding Your Bearings In 
The Research Space Of An Emerging Discipline’ in Morag Goodwin, Bert-Jaap Koops and 
Ronald Leenes (eds), Dimensions of Technology Regulation (Wolf Legal Publishing, 2010) 
309–24, 313.
30 Ibid 314.
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examples of instances that give rise or are likely to give rise to specific legal 
problems will then be discussed in detail. The emphasis is on Australian law, 
but examples from other jurisdictions are also used to illustrate the breadth of 
legal problems that may arise.
III INNOVATIONS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
What is so different about mobile computing? The computers are smaller 
and bits travel wirelessly rather than via Ethernet. How can this possibly 
make any difference? Isn’t a mobile system merely a special case of a 
distributed system? Are there any new and deep issues to be investigated, 
or is mobile computing just the latest fad?31
Although Satyanarayanan asked this question about mobile computing, the 
same questions can be asked generally about the broader range of 
technologies encompassed within eObjects. This section of the paper will 
discuss socio-technical change arising out of some important innovations 
within eObjects.  These innovations are not confined to developments in 
technical features, but also to changes in when and how the technologies are 
used. 
As discussed in Section II(B), in innovations (based on concepts not only of 
‘newness’ but in changes of scale or purpose) lie some of the likely places for 
legal researchers to look for legal problems. These innovations—both 
technical and functional—have given rise to significant changes in how 
people use and interact with information technologies. However, it is 
important to remember, especially considering the large amount of marketing 
hype that exists regarding the potential of eObjects, that many innovations 
have ‘side effects’ that are not beneficial. Putting computers where no 
computers have previously existed creates technical problems that need to be 
overcome, act as constraints on performance or function, or provide 
affordances which may be beneficial to the creator but a disbenefit to the 
people being acted upon by the technology (for example sensor technologies 
that allow for collection of large amounts of personal information). Detriment 
to users may also arise when the law applies more restrictively to an activity 
that is carried out via an eObject as opposed to the same activity carried out 
using non-innovative technologies. Detriment to providers and others may 
also arise when technologies are used in ways not contemplated by their 
designers, while providing a countervailing benefit to the innovating users.32
The particular innovations listed below have been chosen to illustrate the 
diversity of the legal problems that might arise in relation to eObjects. They 
have been identified with the use of Manwaring and Clarke’s attributes 
                                                                
31 Mahadev Satyanarayanan, ‘Fundamental Challenges in Mobile Computing’ (Pt ACM) 
(1996) Principles of Distributed Computing: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual ACM 
Symposium 1, 1.
32 ‘[T]he Street Finds its Own Uses for Things’ William Gibson, ‘Burning Chrome (short 
story)’, Burning Chrome (Harper Collins, 1995). One obvious example of this is the common 
practice of ‘jailbreaking’ of iOS, the operating system on iPhones and related devices, in 
order to install applications that are not available in the Apple App Store, or are more 
expensive than alternatives. See <http://lifehacker.com/5781437/how-to-get-the-most-out-
of-your-jailbroken-ios-device>.
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framework identified in Section II(A) and the Appendix. The innovations
identified are illustrative, not comprehensive, and there are many more that 
could provide useful subjects for further research. These innovations include:
increased volatility and vulnerability of computers and computing 
resources (see Section III(A) and III(B));
the reintroduction of physical world concerns into cyberspace, 
particularly where the physical world affects and is affected by 
eObjects with attributes such as vulnerability and active capacity (see 
Section III(C)), 
the effect of the mobility of eObjects (see Section III(D)); and
the adaptability of eObjects to the context surrounding them, 
particularly when combined with geo-locatability and prevalence
(see Section III(E));
the different levels of implicit human computer interaction,
particularly where it leads to reduced visibility of the device (see
Section III(F)); and
the increased use of autonomous or semi-autonomous devices (see 
Section III(G)).
This list show that it is not only the attributes themselves, but also the 
relationships between them, which give rise to significant innovations in the 
way human beings interact with the technologies. These innovations in turn 
can raise questions about how these interactions are and should be regulated. 
One illustration can be drawn from the interaction of the characteristics of 
mobility, adaptability and prevalence. Mobility and prevalence of portable 
smart devices containing sensors, and the mobility of users interacting with 
smart environments with embedded sensors and communication links, mean 
that the places at which data might be captured have increased exponentially.
The use of context-aware devices means that a particular action by a user 
actually generates more data about that user: where, when, how (and the list 
goes on).  This all means that there is a lot more data being captured, much 
of which is stored, mined, manipulated and disclosed to third parties, and the 
nature of the data may potentially be more intimate33 than that able to be 
collected previously.  
It is therefore not surprising that most of the legal literature discussing 
eObjects concentrates on the privacy and data protection34 implications. This 
is due to the ready availability of this potentially vast store of data about 
individuals, their lives, and their preferences, and in particular the inadequacy 
of existing laws and security systems to protect individuals. However, legal 
                                                                
33 Guido Noto La Diega and Ian Walden, ‘Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking 
into the Nest (2016), 7(2) European Journal of Law and Technology 1, 8.
34 Note that these two terms are distinct, although they can be overlapping. For a discussion of 
the distinction, see eg, R Gellert and S Gutwirth, ‘The Legal Construction of Privacy and 
Data Protection’ (2013) 29(5) Computer Law & Security Review 522. Others have further 
broken down the distinction into ‘dimensions’ (eg Roger Clarke, ‘Introduction to 
Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms (last updated 21 October 
2013)’  <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Intro.html#Mis> or ‘types’ (see Rachel L Finn, 
David Wright and Michael Friedewald, ‘Seven Types of Privacy’ in Serge Gutwirth et al 
(eds), European Data Protection: Coming of Age (Springer, 2013), 3–32).
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problems that may arise from the collection, storage and distribution of large 
amounts of data made possible by eObjects are unlikely to be confined to
these areas. For example, Walker Smith contends that the increasing amount 
of information available to sellers about the way their customers use their 
products is set to increase product liability claims as the nature of 
foreseeability of harm changes.35
Technical innovations found in eObjects are not the only innovations of 
relevance. How the technology is operationalised, applied and used in a 
functional sense is also important. The nature of the interaction between a 
user and a desktop computer is different to that of a user and a smartphone, 
and different again to that of a person driving past a traffic sensor embedded 
in a stop sign. The differences are not just ones of overall design and 
functionality, but also of agency: that is, who or what is initiating and 
controlling the interaction.36 Also, individual attributes may not be the most 
relevant ones, as the interaction between attributes may give rise to the most 
interesting legal issues.    
A Volatility of Resources
Increased volatility of eObjects, and the systems in which they participate, 
may have harmful side effects. However, the disbenefits of these attributes 
are not uniform. Depending on the type of device architecture, these 
particular constraints can operate weakly, strongly, or somewhere in between.  
Satyanarayanan was among the first to outline what he considered the major 
‘constraints of mobility’, which differentiated first mobile and then pervasive 
computing from other forms of distributed computing.37According to 
Satyanarayanan, smart devices will always be ‘resource-poor’ in relation to 
conventional desktop computing, in particular in relation to processing and 
network speed, memory and storage. He attributes this restriction on 
resources to considerations of ‘weight, power, size and ergonomics’.38
Coulouris, writing 15 years later, essentially agreed with Satyanarayanan as 
to these constraints, but conflated them within his concept of ‘volatility’.  
Volatility is the key factor by which he differentiates eObjects and the 
systems in which they participate from the original model of Internet-based 
distributed computing (desktop personal computers with mostly wired access 
to the Internet). Volatility is defined as when ‘the set of users, devices and 
software components in any given environment is liable to change 
                                                                
35 Bryant Walker Smith, ‘Proximity-Driven Liability’ [1777] (2013–14) 102 (6) Georgetown 
Law Journal 1777.
36 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements of
Law and Technology (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015).
37 Satyanarayanan, above n 31; Mahadev Satyanarayanan, ‘Pervasive Computing: Vision and 
Challenges’ (2001) 8(4) IEEE Personal Communications 10. Satyanarayanan’s papers are 
still widely quoted by modern computer scientists. See eg, Frank Adelstein et al, 
Fundamentals of Mobile and Pervasive Computing (McGraw-Hill 2005) 5; Stefan Poslad, 
Ubiquitous Computing: Smart Devices, Environment and Interaction (John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd 2009); George F Coulouris et al, Distributed Systems: Concepts and Design (Addison-
Wesley (Pearson Education, 2012).
38Satyanarayanan, ‘Fundamental Challenges in Mobile Computing’, above n 31.
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frequently’.39 These volatility constraints manifest themselves in the 
different types of connections, energy sources and processing power utilised 
by smart devices.40 In particular, connectivity for devices using wireless 
networks (whether the device is mobile or embedded) is usually more 
variable in relation to bandwidth, latency and reliability. 
However, while the constraints of mobility are real and continuing,41 they do 
not necessarily operate in the same way for all smart devices. For example, 
for small single- or limited-purpose devices, such as sensors in a thermostat 
system, poverty of processing power may well be a given.  However, this 
must be contrasted with the more sophisticated technology available in 
modern smartphones. Advances in miniaturisation and other technologies 
have granted access to processing power, memory and storage for these 
multi-function devices to an extent that was well beyond the capacity of even 
desktop computing only a few years ago. It may always be possible to build 
a faster, more powerful desktop. But for many applications and many users, 
the difference in speed and processing power may not have an appreciable 
effect on the user. 
The converse may well be true of access to a power source. Some low-power 
sensors may have access to what is effectively unlimited power for their 
lifetime, as they draw what little they need from energy harvesting devices, 
such as solar cells or piezoelectric materials (which harvest energy from 
motion).42 Other smart devices, such as smart cards, obtain the minimal 
power supply needed for their functions from other parts of the smart system, 
for example a card reader. However, access to a power source is still a 
significant problem for more complex devices with greater computational 
power. Almost anyone with a smartphone has at one time or other lamented 
over the speed at which his or her battery has been drained. While there have 
been some recent advances in energy harvesting technology that may 
eventually lead to ‘chargeless’ mobile phones,43 any commercial application 
of this is some years away. As a result, many eObjects still need to be 
designed to minimise power consumption, with corresponding negative 
effects on processing power and speed.  
There are significant liability issues which might arise here, especially in 
relation to the failure of eObjects used in healthcare, such as wirelessly-
controlled insulin pumps and pacemakers, which can cause serious physical 
personal harm. It is possible that litigation against software and hardware 
providers will increase as a result of the widespread use of eObjects. Many 
                                                                
39 Coulouris et al, above n 37, 817.
40 Ibid, Chapter 19.
41 Matt Smith, ‘Why your Smartphone won’t be your Next PC’ (2013) 3 August 2013 Digital 
Trends <http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/why-your-smartphone-wont-be-your-
next-pc/#!US6P1>.
42 See eg, solar-powered calculators, or Midé’s Volture Piezoelectric Vibration Energy 
Harvesters (commercially available), <http://www.mide.com/products/volture/
piezoelectric-vibration-energy-harvesters.php>.
43 See eg, Y Mao et al, ‘Sponge-Like Piezoelectric Polymer Films for Scalable and Integratable 
Nanogenerators and Self-Powered Electronic Systems’ (2014) 4(7) Advanced Energy 
Materials. This paper describes their work in developing a mesoporous piezoelectric 
nanogenerator.
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of the issues likely to be raised in such litigation may well already be 
‘covered’ by the existing laws of tort and contract.  However, developers, 
suppliers, investors and consumers may be uncertain about how the law will 
apply to the specific facts surrounding their development, use and sale of 
particular eObjects.  Entities throughout the provider network may well also 
be uncertain about whether their insurance contracts will respond to such 
claims.  Even if they do, the likelihood of higher insurance premiums for 
software companies, along the lines of the professional health care worker 
who pays out many thousands a year in public liability insurance, is more 
probable than not. And this may lead to further uncertainty about maintaining 
profitability, and therefore curb investment in innovative health technologies.
Judges interpreting the common law of tort and contract may well, left to 
themselves and the litigation system, make it clear how the law applies in 
new factual situations. However, the litigation process is not a speedy one.  
Therefore, business and society may legitimately expect Parliament or other 
holders of regulatory power to act, where the uncertainty is so significant as 
to negatively affect the way the technology is funded, developed and used.
The Collingridge dilemma may well have an important part to play here. If 
assumptions are made about the way judges will determine liability in a 
particular circumstance, development of the technology may follow a certain 
path in order to avoid unwanted consequences. This path may be sub-optimal
from an economic and/or social viewpoint, and unnecessarily so if the 
assumptions are proven incorrect by the cases which are eventually decided.  
B Vulnerability and Security
Very early on, Satyanarayanan identified that eObjects are in many cases 
inherently less secure.44 This particularly applies to mobile hardware, which 
can be stolen or damaged more easily. For example, a mobile phone, or a 
wearable electronic device such as a fitness tracker,45 is more vulnerable to
theft than a desktop computer. However, this issue is not confined to the 
simplicity of stealing a small, light and robust machine as supposed to a large, 
heavy and fragile one. 
More recently, significant evidence is emerging that some eObjects and the 
systems in which they are used may well be more prone than conventional 
connected computers not just to physical interference but also to remote 
attacks.  This is due to the existence of particular security vulnerabilities in 
the eObjects themselves and the systems in which they participate. These 
vulnerabilities include:  insecure network services; insecure interfaces; 
insecure software and firmware; lack of encryption; insufficient 
authentication and authorisation; insufficient security configurability; the 
storage of personal data; and the lack of physical safeguards.46
                                                                
44 Satyanarayanan, ‘Pervasive Computing: Vision and Challenges’, above n 31.
45 See eg, the Fitbit Flex wristband (commercially available) which contains sensors which 
tracks physical activity and sleep patterns, and then syncs with smartphones or conventional 
computers to create a data profile. See, eg <http:www.fitbit.com>.
46 This is a consolidated list adapted from the Open Web Application Security Project, Top 10 
IoT Vulnerabilities (2014) Project Open Web Application Security Project Wiki 
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Remote attacks can include the remote operation of the eObject without the 
permission of the local user (‘hacking’) and/or the delivery of malicious 
software (‘malware’).47 Examples of consequences of these types of attacks 
include:
the disclosure of sensitive data (eg passwords, personal information) 
for use by the attacker, or exposure to the outside world;
modification of data for personal gain (including repudiation);
allowing the attacker to act on behalf of the user (‘spoofing’ or 
‘masquerading’);
instigating denial of service (DoS), and distributed DoS attacks;
attacking other eObjects or conventional computers; and
causing physical harm to or destruction of the eObject, surrounding 
objects and/or people.48
Commentators attribute the number of security problems with these devices 
to:
the inexperience of (and possible disinterest by) consumer goods 
manufacturers in security issues (as compared to specialist IT 
manufacturers);
the small size of some devices may not support the processing power 
needed for strong security measures such as encryption; and
most of the devices are not designed to accommodate software 
updates, making security patches unworkable.49
Security researchers have recently proven the ease of remote attacks on 
consumer devices such as the aforementioned fitness trackers,50 healthcare 
devices such as insulin pumps51 and heart defibrillators,52 domestic 
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Transaction Losses from Consumer Device Insecurity?’ (2007) 18 Journal of Law, 
Information & Science 8, 35.
48 This is a consolidated list adapted from Cloud Security Alliance Mobile Working Group, 
Security Guidance for Early Adopters of the Internet of Things (IoT) (April 2015) (2015).
49 Peppet, above n 3; Bruce Schneier, ‘The Internet of Things is Wildly Insecure—And Often 
Unpatchable’ (2014) Wired (1 June 2014) <http://www.wired.com/2014/01/theres-no-
good-way-to-patch-the-internet-of-things-and-thats-a-huge-problem/>.
50 See, eg Fitbit, Mahmudur Rahman, Bogdan Carbunar and Madhusudan Banik, ‘Fit and 
Vulnerable: Attacks and Defenses for a Health Monitoring Device’ (2013) arXiv:1304.5672 
[cs.CR]; Mario Ballano Barcena, Candid Wueest and Hon Lau, Symantec Security Response 
Report, 11 August 2014, How Safe is your Quantified Self?.
51 Jordan Robertson, ‘Insulin Pumps, Monitors Vulnerable to Hacking’ (6 August 
2011) Sydney Morning Herald <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/insulin-pumps-
monitors-vulnerable-to-hacking-20110804-1idfn.html>.
52 Anthony M Townsend, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New 
Utopia (WW Norton & Company 2013), 269. Other healthcare eObjects with identified 
security concerns include drug infusion pumps, X-ray systems, blood refrigeration units and 
CT scans. See Kim Zetter, ‘Medical devices that are vulnerable to life-threatening hacks’ 
(2015) Wired.com <http://www.wired.com/2015/11/medical-devices-that-are-vulnerable-
to-life-threatening-hacks/#slide-x>.
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appliances such as Internet-connected kettles53 and smart fridges,54 and even 
baby monitors55 and children’s’ toys.56 The security implications and the 
damage security exploits can cause already extends past intimately personal 
devices and their potential harm to one person. In the last five years, security 
researchers have successfully managed to exploit flaws in some cars’ 
Internet-connected internal systems in order to wirelessly control cars’ locks, 
brakes, steering and transmission. Hacks have also included remote tracking 
of the cars’ physical locations.57 General Motors took nearly five years to 
fully protect its cars against an exploit identified by security researchers in 
2010.58 This sluggish response by General Motors gives weight to Peppet’s 
concerns about the capability of consumer goods manufacturers—even 
highly sophisticated ones with significant resources—to deal with security 
problems in an efficient and timely way.
In most jurisdictions with developed legal systems, detailed rules about car 
safety exist. However, depending on drafting, these may well be inadequate 
to deal with the increased ability of third parties to cause harm by malicious 
remote control of a heavy motor vehicle at speed. The harm itself is not ‘new’. 
Personal injury and property damage resulting from the impact of a vehicle 
has been occurring since the first wheeled vehicles were invented, and these 
harms are already regulated under both tort law and specific motor vehicle 
legislation.  The legal problem here is most likely to be one of ‘under-
inclusiveness’. Of course, unauthorised remote intrusion is already a criminal 
offence in many jurisdictions,59 but considering the myriad of approaches and 
definitions used by drafters, it is worth re-examining whether this particular 
type of intrusion will automatically be covered under existing legislation. For 
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55 Kashmir Hill, ‘Crib Cams: Watch Out New Parents—Internet-connected Baby Monitors are 
Easy to Hack’ (2015) Fusion.net (3 Sep 2015) <http://fusion.net/story/192189/internet-
connected-baby-monitors-trivial-to-hack/>.
56 Security Ledger, ‘Update: Hello Barbie Fails Another Security Test’ (2015) 
securityledger.com (4 December 2015) <https://securityledger.com/2015/12/hello-barbie-
fails-another-security-test/>.
57 Andy Greenberg, ‘Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It’, Wired,
21 July 2015 <http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/>;
Stephen Checkoway et al, ‘Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack 
Surfaces’ in D Wagner (ed), Proceedings of USENIX Security 2011, Aug 2011 (USENIX, 
2011); Nick Bilton, ‘Bits Blog: Disruptions: As New Targets for Hackers, Your Car and 
Your House’, New York Times, 11 August 2013 
<http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/taking-over-cars-and-homes-remotely/?_r=0>.
58 Andy Greenberg, ‘GM Took 5 Years to Fix a Full-Takeover Hack in Millions of OnStar 
Cars’, Wired, 10 September 2015 <http://www.wired.com/2015/09/gm-took-5-years-fix-
full-takeover-hack-millions-onstar-cars/>.
59 See eg, the US: 18 US Code § 1030: Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with 
Computers, and under the State Codes <http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx>;
Australia: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Part 10.7, Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 247A–247I, 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Pt 6 ss 308–308I, Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), s 44, Criminal 
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Misuse Act 1990 (UK).
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example, the Western Australian legislation confines the offence to unlawful 
access to password-protected computer systems.60 An individual user buying 
a cheap consumer eObject has no guarantee that their device is actually 
password-protected, and usually has no capacity to implement that protection 
for themselves.
Even rules that are not under-inclusive—that is, they cover all relevant 
conduct—may nevertheless be ineffective if they cannot be enforced 
effectively. A hacker may well be in breach of a ‘no access without lawful 
excuse’ rule, but many hackers are notoriously difficult to find and enforce 
criminal penalties against, especially as they could be anywhere on the 
planet.61 To ensure the safety of the public, it would make more sense to 
ensure that car manufacturers should be expected to take some responsibility 
for security flaws in their systems. However, manufacturers’ most likely 
response in the absence of regulatory intervention will be an attempt to 
exclude tortious and other liability for security breaches by clauses inserted 
in sale contracts.
Software contracts are already notorious for the breadth of their exclusion
clauses,62 and it is naïve to assume that car manufacturers’ legal advisors will 
not adopt a similarly broad approach. Some premium car manufacturers may 
also of course improve security features in order to increase brand reputation 
among consumers; but not all, and not all to the same extent. Although car 
manufacturers are already required to manufacture cars to quite strict (and 
detailed) safety standards that are enforced by legislation, these standards 
generally do not include security standards for Internet-connected systems.
In the US, at least, the existing safety standards are not considered sufficient 
to cover this type of intrusion. In 2015 and again in 2017, a Bill directing 
government bodies63 to promulgate regulatory standards for car cybersecurity 
(and data protection) was introduced into the US Senate.64
C Vulnerability and Active Capacity
The discussion so far highlights that one of the key consequences of 
technological developments related to eObjects is the re-emergence of 
physical spaces and places as an important concept in information 
technology.65 When scholars and others talk about cyberspace, they tend to 
concentrate on its intangible aspects, its status as a mass ‘consensus-
hallucination’66 rather than a space in which actions are carried out.
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Cyberspace has traditionally been conceived as a world without boundaries 
or physicality, or even a positive denial of a physical place.67 The role of the 
physical environment in conventional distributed systems is usually limited 
to acting as a conduit for power and communications, and as a repository for 
data storage and processing units.68 However, the physical location of an 
embedded smart device—or, in the case of a mobile device, its ability to move 
quickly and easily in space between physical locations without losing 
functionality—forms an essential part of its nature, and is inextricably linked 
to its use by humans.69 So when we move from a cyberspace ‘no-place’ to a 
confrontation with the limitations of the physical world, this gives rise to 
certain questions about how the law will and should act in particular 
situations.  
One of the most obvious implications of the physicality of devices and 
systems in eObjects is in the security concerns outlined in Section III(B),
particularly in the example of car hacking. A desktop computer is a large and 
heavy object, but remote hackers have not been generally able to pick one up 
and throw it across a room. Within the world of eObjects, a potentially 
dangerous innovation lies in the interaction between the eObject attributes of 
vulnerability and mobility – a malicious hacker can remotely control a one-
and-a-half tonne piece of metal travelling at 100km/hour and use it to injure 
people and property. The relevant legal problem of ‘under-inclusiveness’ is 
discussed in Section II(B) above. 
The greatly desired ‘smart home’ potentially brings with it similar practical 
problems, although mobility is not the attribute interacting with vulnerability 
here, but rather active capacity, the ability of eObjects to interact with the 
physical world. For example, you may own a smart house, and have just 
bought an Internet-enabled designer lamp for both its aesthetic appeal and its 
advertised compatibility with your particular smart house system. However, 
unbeknownst to you, the lamp contains a security vulnerability that allows a 
rogue to hack into your smart house system, turn off the sprinklers and the 
fire alarm, and turn on the stovetop. Consequently, the house burns down. 
The rogue cannot be tracked down, so a search for liability will begin with 
the service providers relating to your smart house. A similar problem may 
arise here with ‘under-inclusiveness’ around safety and security standards as 
applies to car hacking (see Section III(B)). However, in the smart home 
example there are likely to be many more suppliers and manufacturers 
providing eObjects and their related services. Therefore, a new set of 
uncertainties arises around concepts of causation and liability in contract, in 
tort and under consumer protection laws.
For example, in Australia, consumer goods are sold subject to a guarantee of 
‘acceptable quality’, under section 54 of the Australian Consumer Law 
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(ACL)70. A lamp that does not turn on is obviously not of acceptable quality, 
but what about an Internet-connected lamp with a security vulnerability? 
However, in a common law system like Australia’s, until a judge answers the 
specific question as to on which side of the ‘acceptable quality’ line security 
vulnerabilities lie, consumers, suppliers and insurance companies will not 
know how the law applies in this situation. And, as factual situations shift, 
this uncertainty will continue. The position may be somewhat clearer in the 
United States. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has brought a number 
of enforcement actions against companies relating to inadequate 
cybersecurity practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act,71 which prohibits ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce’. However, it has only recently been confirmed by the US Court 
of Appeals that inappropriate cybersecurity practices could amount to ‘unfair 
conduct’ under section 5, in an action by the FTC against a hotel chain whose 
customer data had been subject to three data breaches in two years.72
The consequences of this uncertainty outside of judicial decisions are
however somewhat predictable. Consumer guarantees of acceptable quality 
cannot be excluded by contract. However, specific disclosures by a supplier 
can remove the protection of this guarantee.73 Knowing this, and once aware 
of the potential liability, suppliers will (particularly to maintain insurance 
coverage) most likely amend their point of sale material and/or contractual 
boilerplate to include a broad ‘disclosure’, which will have the same effect as 
an exclusion clause. An attempt by consumers to shift blame to the smart 
home system supplier for a failure to block security exploits at the point of 
interconnection will most likely face the same contractual roadblock.
D Mobility
One common attribute of eObjects is mobility. This attribute, along with a 
closely related attribute, portability (where the eObject itself can be moved 
but is not designed to communicate while doing so) mean that transactions 
and interactions with people, with businesses, with information and with the 
devices themselves are carried out in different ways and in different places, 
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than those transacted under the desktop model. One important consequence 
is that the nature of the information flow around the transactions can also be 
substantially different from that found in traditional computing, particularly 
traditional e-commerce. In particular, the widespread use of sensor 
technologies makes it likely that a greater quantity of data can and will be 
collected by eObjects (whether they are mobile or whether the people 
interacting with them are). This increase in data collection is occurring 
‘alongside the rapid deployment of ancillary technologies, equipment, and 
services to aggregate information and make it widely accessible’.74
This greater availability of data can lead to issues around privacy, data 
protection and the legitimacy of surveillance; but it can also have benefits for 
individuals. For example, Peppet points out that consumers can now access a 
greater availability of information about products while in-store, including 
review sites that specifically raise issue with onerous contract terms, as well 
as the quality of the product and ongoing support services. He argues that 
consumers can therefore more easily work out what firms offer the best deal, 
over and above price considerations.75
The ‘constraints of mobility’ identified by Satyanarayanan76 also mean that 
in some cases different technical or business solutions are implemented for 
activities that are functionally the same to a user whether undertaken on a 
desktop or via an eObject. The solutions proposed to overcome a problem 
with, or meet an opportunity for, mobility may well have different legal 
implications, even though the difference cannot be seen or is considered 
irrelevant by the end user. One particular example of this has already been 
raised in formal litigation.  In Australia, s111 of the Copyright Act 1968 
allows for copying of television shows for private use without breach of 
copyright (the ‘time-shifting exception’).
In National Rugby League Investments Pty Limited v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd
[2012] FCAFC 59, however, an implementation of a time-shifting solution 
via mobile phones led to a breach of the Act. Telstra had entered into an 
exclusive deal with the AFL and the ARL for its mobile customers to view 
football matches on their mobile phones. Optus offered a competing service 
where its mobile users could record and play back football matches offered 
on free-to-air television on their mobile phones or other computers. The 
technical structure of the service offered by Optus involved:
the interception of the television signal by Optus receivers;
the making and storage of an individual copy (one for each user) on 
Optus servers; and
access by the user when s/he wished to watch a particular show.
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The making and storing of the copies by the service provider on their own 
server, rather than the user’s device, would have been done (at least in part) 
in order to address the resource constraints of mobile phone hardware and 
Internet connectivity. In particular, the storage space required to copy large 
media files would soon overwhelm the capacity of most smartphones.
It is arguable that from the perspective of the individual user, this activity 
whether performed at home or on the move was the same, comprising the 
recording and playback of free-to-air television shows at a time that suited 
them.  The trial judge agreed with this approach. However, the appellate court 
disagreed. The extent of the uncertainty raised by this issue here was 
highlighted by the fact that the trial judge’s approach was similar to that 
adopted by appellate courts in the US and Singapore. The Full Federal Court 
in Australia preferred the approach of a Japanese appellate court, but not 
without controversy.77 When the dispute first arose, it revealed a legal 
problem falling into Bennett Moses’ ‘uncertainty’ category: that is, the 
uncertainty of the application of s111 to new ways of making copies of 
television programs for private use. The Full Court itself acknowledged the 
uncertainty in the questions raised in the appeal.78 They also admitted that 
uncertainty continued to exist in relation to other technical solutions for time-
shifting, which were not the subject of this litigation.79
In addition to the continuing uncertainties, the decision has raised a potential 
problem of ‘under-inclusiveness’, depending of course on the viewpoint of 
the person examining s111. However, a policy question remains. Is the 
interest that a private user has in being able to make copies for time-shifting 
purposes one that should be protected notwithstanding any third-party
technologies and third-party services they employ?
The question of possible under-inclusiveness was addressed, in an indirect 
way, in the decision. The Full Federal Court explicitly recognised that 
technological neutrality was seen to be a desirable goal,80 but did not believe 
that s111 as drafted operated to achieve this goal. The judges implied that if 
this goal was to be met, Parliament must act to amend the wording of s111. 
A ‘liberal approach’ to interpretation, such as that proposed by the law and 
technology theorist Cockfield,81 may have allowed the judges to address the 
lack of protection of private users’ interests. However, the judges refused to 
take this approach, based partially on an argument that there were ‘conflicting
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interests and values’82 to be taken into account, which in their opinion called 
for a legislative choice to be made, not a judicial one.  
Of course, this interpretation by default ranked the interests of the copyright 
owners and their licensees above those of private users and technology 
innovators. The question remains for Parliament of whether this is the
appropriate ranking to make? This dilemma of course does not just illustrate 
an example of ‘under-inclusiveness’, but also highlights the difficulties
regulators must face in addressing such a legal problem. For in many, if not 
most, cases of socio-technical change leading to claims of under- (or indeed 
over-) inclusiveness, there will be a competition of interests. The competition 
will be between those of members the ‘under-included’ community, and those 
corporations, individuals or governments who receive an economic, social or 
other benefit from the status quo.
E Adaptability, Geo-locatability and Prevalence
Adaptability and geo-locatability are closely related attributes of eObjects. 
Adaptability, also known as ‘context-awareness’, refers to the idea that an 
eObject can identify in real time some part of its user’s context—who the 
user is, where she is, the environment through which she is moving, her habits 
and preferences—and it or the system in which it participates can reconfigure
and adapt itself accordingly. The greater capabilities brought about by 
adaptability in technology, if realised to their full potential (and this is a big 
‘if’), will most likely bring about the greatest socio-technical changes related 
to eObjects.  
In contrast, geo-locational technologies have been adopted in very many 
mobile eObjects. Within the traditional model of distributed information 
technologies, where a desktop is physically located has been, in most 
contexts, irrelevant,83 as well as difficult to determine accurately.  However, 
now eObjects are mobile, and more likely to be ‘personal’, that is, intimately 
associated with an individual. A person with a smartphone can be located 
(almost) anywhere at (almost) anytime. Geo-locatability is not only available 
to telecommunication carriers or government security agencies, but to 
everyday consumers using a cheap (or even free) app on their smartphones, 
such as ‘Find my Friends’ (Apple iOS) or Life360 (Android and Windows). 
However, it must be emphasised that the accuracy of such location tracking, 
whether consensual or imposed, is not always, or even often, particularly 
robust. Accuracy and reliability of common geo-locational technologies are 
heavily dependent on the device, the actual location techniques and the 
circumstances at the time that they are used.84 Geo-locational data may also 
be obfuscated or falsified, for example to protect privacy or hide 
                                                                
82 National Rugby League Investments Pty Limited v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 59,
[95].
83 There is at least one notable exception to this: ‘geoblocking’ (the practice of limiting access 
to content, particularly TV programs and movies, on the Internet based on your geographic 
location): Daniel Dionne, ‘Explainer: What is Geoblocking?’ (2013) The Conversation
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84 Katina Michael and Roger Clarke, ‘Location and Tracking of Mobile Devices: 
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responsibility for criminal activity.85 This is particularly important to 
remember when such technologies are presented as evidence in criminal 
trials.
The use of geo-locatability and adaptability attributes in the commercial 
sphere was early postulated by Kang and Cuff in 1996, through the 
development of their speculative description of a ‘networked mall’.86 This 
idea of a ‘networked mall’ has recently manifested itself in reality with the 
introduction of enterprise mobile marketing eObjects such as Apple’s 
iBeacon (although the adaptability features are fairly unsophisticated at 
present). iBeacon and like products (‘beacon implementations’) marry 
precise geo-location targeting and context data (for example retail products 
within near proximity, purchase history and preferences, time of day). Beacon 
implementations use indoor positioning devices and systems with small low-
power sensors87 to track when subscribers carrying their mobile phones enter 
a particular physical space (such as a particular section of a department store).
When a person is located in a particular place (for example the shoe aisle in 
a department store), this triggers an action by applications in the mobile 
phone, such as notifications as to nearby items which are then offered at a 
discount. Although the use of beacon technology is not yet widespread, in 
2015 it had already been installed in some malls and has extended into other 
public spaces such as airports, baseball stadiums and museums. This 
technology is also currently being used or piloted by shopping centres, fast 
food, sporting, airline and pharmacy and other business enterprises.88
Beacon implementations rely on eObjects with access to personalised 
profiling data and with the potential to be programmed to act in accordance 
with copious research on how consumers actually make purchasing decisions. 
An average human shop assistant, at least when dealing with a new customer, 
is unlikely to have either the personal knowledge of the customer, or the 
aggregated knowledge of purchasing patterns, that can be contained in or 
associated with an eObject. The digitisation of commerce generally 
(mediated through conventional desktops and eObjects) may grant firms with 
large marketing budgets an enhanced ability to target consumers’ cognitive 
                                                                
85 Roger Clarke, ‘A Framework for Analysing Technology’s Negative and Positive Impacts 
on Freedom and Privacy (Draft of 16 August 2015)’ 
<http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Biel15-DuDA.html#App3>.
86 Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff, ‘Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere’ (2005) 
62 Washington and Lee Law Review 93, 121–45. 
87 iBeacon uses the Bluetooth Low Energy communications standard, but other beacon 
technologies use both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi (eg Motorola Solutions and Datzing).
88 See, eg Macy’s, McDonalds, Major League Baseball, Walgreens, Virgin Atlantic, Japan 
Airlines, American Airlines. Trips Reddy, ‘15 Companies From Airports to Retail Already 
Using Beacon Technology’ (2014) <https://www.umbel.com/blog/mobile/15-companies-
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(2014) (7 October 2015) B2B Marketing <http://www.b2bmarketing.
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Bendigo Marketplace <http://iproximity.net/smart-shopping-bendigo-marketplace-ibeacon-
proximity-enabled-hellolocal-app/> and Tourism & Events Queensland 
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biases and particular vulnerabilities and use that information to encourage 
consumers to make purchasing decisions in the firms’ best interests, rather 
than in the consumers’ own.89 A further attribute of eObjects—prevalence—
will come into play here, not just in terms of delivery of the message, but in 
collection of data. The uses of eObjects in e-commerce widen the reach of a 
marketer to a significant degree.  As a result of all of these factors, 
commentators in the US90 and Europe91 have expressed concern that 
consumer protection law in their jurisdictions will not be broad enough to 
cope with the increased capacity of firms to collect intimate data and exploit 
it in ways where they have a high potential to persuade consumers into 
unwanted transactions.
This is also a potential concern for Australia. This type of taking advantage 
of consumer weaknesses can be sensibly categorised as some sort of ‘unfair 
persuasion’92, but the law in Australia does not recognise this as a general 
principle of prohibited conduct. The common law, and the Australian 
Consumer Law contained in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (ACL) have some specific areas where consumers are protected 
from sellers preying on their vulnerabilities, but these are confined and it is 
not yet certain whether or not these new forms of conduct will actually be 
regulated under these provisions. For example, the ACL provisions on 
misleading or deceptive conduct93 have previously placed considerable 
reliance on the existence of a misrepresentation.94 While the High Court has 
recently made it clear that Australian law does not require an explicit or 
implied misrepresentation for section 18 of the ACL to apply, there is still a 
requirement that the plaintiff be led (or is likely to be led) into error.95 What 
is currently uncertain is the scope of the definition of ‘led into error’, and how 
broadly judges will interpret this requirement. Where such techniques are 
used exclusively, the consumer will not be in receipt of incorrect or 
incomplete information as to any innate attribute of the goods or services. 
Rather, they are put in a situation where they are more likely to agree to buy 
something due to their own vulnerabilities, such as being offered a discount 
on conveniently located junk food at the end of a long day when their 
willpower is most likely to be at its lowest ebb.
ACL provisions on unsolicited consumer agreements96 do not require any 
form of falsehood, but recognise the need for heightened protections where 
                                                                
89 Ryan Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’ (2014) 82(4) George Washington Law Review
995, 999, 1043–44.
90 Ibid.
91 Natali Helberger, ‘Profiling and Targeting Consumers in the Internet of Things—A New 
Challenge for Consumer Law’ in Reiner Schulze and Dirk Staudenmayer (eds), Digital 
Revolution:  Challenges for Contract Law in Practice (Hart Publishing, 2016).
92 Calo, above n 89, 237.
93 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Australian Consumer Law, Part 2-1 Division 1, 
Schedule 2.
94 For a discussion of the case law on this, see Alex Bruce, Consumer Protection Law in 
Australia (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014) 85–86.
95 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd [2010] HCA 
31, [15].
96 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2, Australian Consumer Law, Part 3-
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consumers are put in situations where they are at their most vulnerable.  
However, these provisions are confined to door-to-door and telemarketing 
sales, and the use of digital persuasive techniques will not fall under these 
protections.  This is concerning in the light of psychological research that 
indicates that people can and do respond to computer-delivered persuasive 
techniques in a similar way as they do with real people.97
Of course, it is not yet a given that Australian law should protect a consumer 
against these types of frailties. However, if this becomes the normative 
position, the ACL in its current state is definitely uncertain, and likely to be 
under-inclusive. The more general law prohibiting unconscionable conduct, 
both under statute and in equity, may be called into action by consumers. But 
this in itself will most likely lead to a problem of uncertainty, as judges have 
never yet had to deal with this combination of ‘intense systematisation’ and 
‘personalisation’ of data98, and will find little in the cases by way of precedent 
or even analogy. 
F Reduced Visibility and Human–Computer Interaction
From the beginning, Weiser and others have characterised ubiquitous 
computing as ‘calm technology’, or ‘technology which disappears’.99 Of 
course, many eObjects are still highly conspicuous, for example smartphones 
or ‘phablets’.100 For other eObjects however, particularly wearables or 
surveillance technologies, the computing power and/or data communication 
capabilities of the objects are unobtrusive to a greater or lesser degree. This 
lack of visibility potentially has consequences for the nature of human 
interaction with these types of technologies. Of course, this concept is already 
known within conventional distributed computing. Much of the interaction 
between the multiple machines and systems that are required to do mundane 
tasks, such as searching the Internet, is hidden from users, who to all intents 
and purposes appear to themselves to be interacting with one machine and 
one software application. However, the interactions are still there and tend to 
be intentional and purposeful, by using peripherals such as a keyboard, 
mouse, or touchpad.
However, advances in implicit (or at least less obtrusive) human computer 
interaction (both current and projected), mean that this level of purposeful 
interaction should not be taken for granted.  Much of this technology is still 
in the research stage,101 but some technologies have already matured to 
commercialisation. Networked sensors to manage lighting in commercial 
                                                                
97 BJ Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and Do
(Amsterdam, Boston: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers 2003) cited in Calo, above n 89).
98 Calo, above n 89, 1021.
99 Mark Weiser, ‘The Computer in the 21st Century’ (Pt 1991) [94] (1991) Scientific American
94, 1; Mark Weiser and John Seely Brown, The Coming Age of Calm Technology (5 October 
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101 For examples, see Rami Albatal et al (eds), Shaping our Digital Lives (2014), Masaaki 
Kurosu (ed), Towards Intelligent and Implicit Interaction (Springer, 2013).
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buildings are already mainstream.102 Gesture-based command technology is 
common in the games market.103 Wearable cameras with automated photo-
taking functions, or ‘lifeloggers’ have also recently entered the consumer and 
healthcare markets,104 following on from a longer history of use of body-
mounted cameras by law enforcement agencies.105
If visibility of the technology used to mediate consumer contracts does 
decrease significantly, this may well give rise to contractual and consumer 
issues. It is no new thing to have contracts mediated through technology.
However, interesting questions can be asked as to whether the absence of 
particular forms of contractual processes changes the dynamic of the 
relationship between contracting parties. If the dynamic does change, how 
will judges interpreting the existing common law and legislation deal with 
this? For example, what issues might arise around enforceability of contracts 
formed through interaction with ‘invisible’ devices? How is consent to terms 
and conditions indicated, and proved, in the absence of point-and-click? How 
will a judge interpret the requirements of notice for onerous clauses in 
environments where such notice can only practically be provided a step, or 
number of steps, removed from the purchase and use of a relevant item?
One of the greatest impacts of developments in implicit human-computer 
interaction is of course its potential impact on privacy and data protection. If 
the level of implicit human computer interaction built into an eObject, or a 
series of eObjects, is such that a person does not know you are interacting 
with a device or devices that gathers data and transmits it to others, how can 
that person prohibit or limit the use of the information gathered as a result of 
that interaction?
When personal information is collected from individuals by firms and 
government bodies, privacy policies are required in many jurisdictions, such 
as Australia, the US and Europe. For example, the Australian Privacy 
Principles (discussed in more detail below) require Australian government 
bodies and commercial organisations to have a privacy policy. A privacy 
policy is easy to implement as part of conventional computing via a link on a 
website to a detailed privacy policy and an ‘I agree’ button. Most companies 
(in jurisdictions such as the US, Australia and Canada at least) will have a 
privacy policy and display it on their website, and will, theoretically, be 
subject to sanctions if the policy is not complied with.106
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While the content and effectiveness of privacy policies are routinely 
criticised,107 even this weak protection appears to be breaking down with the 
advent of eObjects. As implicit human computer interaction techniques 
become more developed, more eObjects will not need traditional display 
screens or input mechanisms such as keyboards. Privacy policies require text 
and screen space, but it is difficult to find a practical way for many eObjects 
to deliver notice of the data it is collecting, let alone what the vendor or user 
is planning to do with it. This situation becomes more complicated when the 
buyer is not the only person about whom data is collected, such as in the case 
of eObjects with embedded cameras. Early indications are that makers of 
eObjects are not aware of their own obligations in relation to privacy notices, 
or are choosing to ignore them (possibly due to weak enforcement 
mechanisms). A recent survey108 of 20 popular consumer eObjects ranging 
from fitness trackers to breathalysers to home automation systems found that 
none contained a privacy policy packaged with the object, nor any indication 
where one could be located.109  Many of the eObjects examined did require 
an app to be downloaded to make them fully functional, which assumes the 
use of at least a small screen on a smartphone. However, even in the 
downloading step, many did not provide a privacy policy or any indication of 
where to find one.110
One example analysed in the survey was that of Breathometer Inc, which 
currently markets a device that tests alcohol breath levels. The Breathometer 
device is connected wirelessly to an application on a smartphone, which 
stores and displays data on current and historical breath levels. There was no 
privacy policy provided in the package, or as part of the download of the 
related smartphone application, and there was no information provided in the 
packaging on where to find one. The author of the survey eventually tracked 
down a privacy policy in an obscure part of the company’s website. This 
policy prohibits deletion of user data and allows the company to use the data 
to customise advertisements, as well as other terms.
The lack of connection between the purchase and the privacy terms is 
troubling:
Given the many potentially troubling uses for breathalyzer data—think 
employment decisions; criminal liability implications; and health, life, or 
car insurance ramifications—one might expect data-related disclosures to 
dominate the Breathometer user’s purchasing and activation experience. 
Instead, the consumer is essentially led to the incorrect assumption that this 
small black device is merely a good like any other—akin to a stapler or 
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ballpoint pen—rather than a data source and cloud-based data 
repository.111
The Breathometer purchasing structure is not the most problematic example 
uncovered by the research. The privacy policy that existed on the 
Breathometer website was at least specifically designed for the eObject and 
services sold by the companies. However, many of the other privacy policies 
examined in the survey, when finally located, had serious issues with their 
drafting. The wording of the clauses related only to use of the manufacturer’s 
website rather than the eObject itself, and therefore contained considerable 
ambiguities and key omissions.112
Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 1.5 requires that an organisation ‘must 
take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to make its … privacy 
policy available … in such form as appropriate’.113 Additionally, APP 1.5 
includes a Note that ‘an APP entity will usually make its APP privacy policy 
available on the entity's website’. In traditional e-commerce, where goods 
and services are sold on a website, privacy policies, as well as other terms 
and conditions, at least usually sit within the same virtual ‘space’ as the 
purchase (albeit often somewhat obscurely placed).  The seller can without 
any significant uncertainty comply with its obligation in the APP, and a 
consumer knows where to look.  However, meeting the obligation in the APP 
is not nearly so clear when it comes to eObjects. Suppliers will most likely 
continue to take the existing cheapest and simplest route of website-based 
privacy policies. They may or may not change the text of the policies to 
specifically apply to eObjects, which may then be problematic for both 
suppliers and consumers. For example, a user’s need to know what data is 
being collected and how it is being used in relation to such eObjects is 
actually greater than in traditional e-commerce due to:
eObjects’ greater potential to gather data about a purchaser and the 
people they interact with, such as in the case of a breathalyser, a 
fitness tracking device or a lifelogging camera; and
the reduced likelihood of consumers considering the possibility and
consequences of data being gathered, stored and used when such 
activities happen in a less obtrusive way than by active entry of 
information into a text box. 
The meaning of ‘appropriate form’ is unclear in the context of eObjects, 
thereby placing it in the context of uncertainty. There is also a potential 
problem of under-inclusiveness if the Note to APP 1.5 is used as intended as 
a guide to interpretation by the regulator114 and judiciary, meaning a supplier 
could fulfil its obligation merely by placing the policy on its website without 
other forms of notice to the ultimate user. If eObject purchasing and use 
activities are completely disconnected from the data-gatherer’s website, then 
it seems insufficient that the only notification is contained there. The
unobtrusiveness of the data-gathering function adds to the problems.
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Consumers using eObjects are viewing themselves as performing physical 
activities such as breathing out, or walking, or injecting insulin. They are not 
consciously providing information to a third party as they do when they fill 
in a website form. 
G Autonomy
Autonomous devices and systems are those with the capability to make 
decisions and take actions that are independent of a human user.115 Autonomy 
is a common and desired attribute in eObjects, especially when viewed 
through the lens of those supporting ambient intelligence scenarios. Where it 
is present, decisions are made by systems and machines rather than humans.
Of course this is often advantageous, as it reduces the need of humans to be 
involved in low-level decision making when they are only interested in high-
level outcomes. For example, a person may regularly be engaged in making 
presentations in a large organisation with a number of different meeting 
rooms. A smart office system in conjunction with a mobile device could be 
programmed to find a person’s location within the office, and project the 
slideshow onto the nearest screen, without any intervention from the user 
other than a simple instruction to ‘run slideshow’.
One current focus for autonomous design in eObjects is the self-driving car.  
The first tests of a driverless car in the southern hemisphere were undertaken 
in Adelaide in November 2015,116 following on from at least 5 years of trials 
in other countries.117 Depending on the relevant jurisdiction, ‘new’ laws may 
be required to allow driverless cars to be registered and driven on the roads.
For example, current New York legislation prohibits drivers from operating 
a motor vehicle without having at least one hand on the wheel at all times.118
The rule is clearly directed towards the goal of ensuring that a driver can react 
quickly to avoid a collision, but is arguably obsolescent under Bennett 
Moses’ categorisation in an age where contact with the steering wheel is not 
required for control.119
Not surprisingly, some significant risks have been identified with the capacity 
of autonomous systems to control decision-making. An autonomous system 
may well have clear embedded rationales and procedures for its decision-
making, but those procedures are usually programmed by someone other than 
the ultimate user. Moving from current capabilities of autonomous systems 
to those that might occur in the future, systems that can learn and adapt to 
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environmental change have an even greater capacity to deviate from what is 
known about the system when it is first installed or interacted with by a user.
The risks of this type of autonomous design can include:
loss of user control;120
unanticipated and undesired behaviours121—from the perspective of 
the primary user and/or others affected by its use;122
systems which learn to operate outside safe or normal limits, or to 
conflict with user intentions;123 and
the algorithms for decision-making processes and the assumptions 
behind them may not be accessible to users,124 which makes them 
vulnerable to undiscovered error and consequent inappropriate 
decision-making.
In the case of future developments in driverless cars, the risks of loss of user 
control and undesired behaviours have recently been the subject of some
concern. These concerns concentrate on the possibility of very sophisticated 
crash-avoidance systems in cars, and the programming of decision-making in 
the case of an imminent crash that has multiple harmful possible outcomes.125
Scholars have reformulated the so-called ‘trolley problem’ thought 
experiment126 to apply to self-driving vehicles, for example as:
You’re driving an autonomous car in manual mode—you’re inattentive and 
suddenly are heading towards five people at a farmer’s market. Your car 
senses this incoming collision, and has to decide how to react. If the only 
option is to jerk to the right, and hit one person instead of remaining on its 
course towards the five, what should it do?127
Other formulations postulate a decision-making algorithm that chooses the 
safety of the driver over pedestrians, or passengers over drivers.128 A driver 
somewhere makes such a decision every day, but usually in a split second, 
without any real possibility of considering the ethics of his or her decision. 
The ability of manufacturers to pre-meditate such decisions (or for drivers to 
choose at leisure particular ethics settings in their cars) may well be seen as 
a legal problem fitting into Bennett Moses’ first category of requiring 
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specially tailored laws required due to the unique nature of new forms of 
conduct.
IV CONCLUSION
eObjects with a myriad of different affordances are experiencing significant 
growth in modern society. With this growth comes change, and with socio-
technical change comes the possibility of a disconnection between existing 
law and the new things, activities, and relationships that arise out of the 
development and use of eObjects. There exist significant reasons that legal 
researchers and law reform bodies should have the tools and the will to 
quickly and rigorously analyse and respond to this disconnection. These 
imperatives include not only the need for timely intervention in 
circumstances where the Collingridge dilemma is manifested and 
technologies with detrimental effects may be effectively entrenched by 
inaction, but also to ensure that any legal reaction is not an overreaction 
which may inappropriately or prematurely stifle development of beneficial 
technologies.
This paper has attempted to uncover a diversity of existing and potential legal 
problems that might arise in different contexts arising out of the development 
of the third wave of computing. This analysis has not only identified specific 
legal problems in particular areas but also some problems more general in 
their application, which are worth further investigation. Firstly, but not 
surprisingly, uncertainty has emerged as a significant issue, with important 
consequences.  Rule-making bodies must find ways to deal appropriately with 
the Collingridge dilemma. Otherwise, regulation runs the risk of stifling 
beneficial innovative practices or being inadequate to protect users’ 
legitimate interests. The likelihood of the latter is heightened by the fact that 
the most likely reaction of manufacturers and suppliers to risks posed by 
uncertainty will be an attempt to exclude liability through contractual terms 
and conditions. These (usually) non-negotiable terms and conditions, 
including clauses relating to privacy and data protection, pose particular risks 
for individual users.129
The limitations on text display of many consumer eObjects means that forms 
of consent are often questionable, and proper notice of terms contested. 
Secondly, the category of under-inclusiveness has emerged as critical when 
considering new conduct made possible by eObjects. Under-inclusiveness (as 
well as over-inclusiveness) will often give rise to a competition of interests. 
Therefore, when faced with questions of under- or over-inclusiveness of new 
products, activities and relationships arising out of new technologies, rule-
making bodies will need to make significant policy decisions as to whose 
interests should be given priority.  For should those detrimentally affected by 
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the conduct be protected at the expense of those making a commercial return 
from the conduct, or should commercial interests prevail?
Due to the diversity of both the technologies concerned, and the areas of law 
and regulation that may be affected, this paper cannot provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all legal problems that might arise out of the new 
activities, things and relationships made possible by eObjects. The emphasis 
in this paper has been on demonstrating the utility of a particular approach 
relevant to eObjects, and an indication of the diversity of the issues that might 
arise. The approach is not limited to any one area of the law, nor to the 
specific eObjects discussed in detail. This paper is intended to provide a 
roadmap for further research into any and all legal problems arising out of the 
new activities, products and relationships made possible by eObjects. For 
example, further research may analyse legal problems that arise out of a 
particular subset of eObjects, for example driverless cars, or those that arise 
in a particular industry, such as healthcare.
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APPENDIX
CORE AND COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF eOBJECTS130
Core Attributes
Object: physical object, natural or artificial, inert or living
Computer: contains one or more general-purpose programmable computers
Embedded: one or more computers physically embedded
Data-collection: contains one or more sensors that can collect or generate 
data
Data-handling: capability to process data
Data communication: can communicate with other nodes inside the same 
object, or with other objects
Common Attributes
Active capacity: can act on physical world
Adaptability: context-aware
Addressability: has a unique address
Associability with living beings: humans, plants, animals
Autonomy: decision-making capabilities
Dependency: remote services or infrastructure
Geo-locatability: can be found in physical space
Human–Computer Interaction (HCI): can be unobtrusive or invisible, or 
contain different levels of implicit HCI
Identifiability: has an identifier for the physical object
Network locatability: locatable in virtual space
Mobility: eObjects may be operational while moving within a physical space, 
when used by a person on the move or acting autonomously
Operational, economic and social impact: eObjects have both benefits and 
detriments
Portability: object can be moved but no connectivity while mobile
Prevalence: pervasive or ubiquitous
Use pattern: used by an individual, or small numbers, or large numbers
Volatility: connectivity, energy, storage and processing capabilities may be 
limited or intermittent 
Vulnerability: risk of security breaches, theft, and physical damage or 
destruction
                                                                
130 Manwaring and Clarke, above n 5, Tables 2 and 3, 599–601.
